Cyber Security Solution For Water Treatment's Mixed IT & OT Networks

Your Water System Is Experiencing a Disruption. Is It a Misconfiguration—or Is a Cyberattack Underway?
REMI Water automatically analyzes native IT and OT logs, operator records, and operational reports to reconstruct suspicious activity across treatment and distribution systems. Its embedded AI correlates access events, remote sessions, control-system commands, and configuration changes to distinguish evidence of adversarial tampering from internal misconfiguration. REMI traces what changed, when, and through which accounts and devices—delivering an evidence-linked forensic timeline, diagrams, and a complete report set, including a SITREP with recommended next steps.

REMI analyzes water IT and OT records offline to uncover cyber tampering, attack staging, and configuration changes.
REMI Water automatically ingests native logs and reports from utility IT networks, SCADA systems, PLCs, operator interfaces, and remote monitoring equipment. As records move through its AI pipeline, REMI normalizes their different formats into a unified dynamic schema that adapts to the incoming data—aligning timestamps, accounts, device identifiers, alarms, control commands, and configuration changes while preserving references to the original evidence.
REMI correlates network access with operator actions and process events to reconstruct suspicious activity, expose attack staging, and evaluate evidence of cyber tampering versus internal misconfiguration. It generates forensic reports, an evidence-linked timeline, diagrams, and a Cyber SITREP with prioritized next response steps—all locally and fully offline.
✅ Ingest mixed water IT and OT records
✅ Normalize data into a dynamic schema
✅ Correlate access, commands, and process events
✅ Trace configuration and control-setting changes
✅ Reconstruct attack staging and suspicious activity
✅ Generate reports, timelines, diagrams, and a SITREP
Water OT Logs & Reports
| SCADA servers and control platforms | Supervisory control servers, alarm services, operator actions, communications events, and treatment or distribution control records. |
| Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) | Controllers operating pumps, valves, dosing equipment, and treatment sequences; program downloads, operating-mode changes, diagnostics, and configuration records where available. |
| Remote terminal units (RTUs) | Remote controllers at wells, reservoirs, tanks, and pumping stations; telemetry, communications status, field commands, and configuration records. |
| Human-machine interfaces (HMIs) | Operator panels and control-room displays; sign-ins, alarm acknowledgments, manual overrides, and setpoint changes where recorded. |
| Engineering workstations | PLC programming computers, configuration tools, project files, logic revisions, controller transfers, and maintenance-session records. |
| Process historians and alarm archives | Time-stamped process values, equipment states, alarm histories, trend data, and recorded changes across treatment and distribution operations. |
| Pump controls and variable-frequency drives | Pump controllers, motor controls, and VFDs; start/stop events, speed references, operating parameters, trips, and fault histories where available. |
| Motorized valves and actuators | Valve actuators, positioners, and control interfaces; commanded positions, position feedback, local/remote status, and fault indications. |
| Chemical dosing and disinfection controls | Metering-pump controllers, chlorination systems, and UV controllers; dosing settings, equipment status, alarms, and recorded operator adjustments. |
| Water-quality analyzers | Chlorine, pH, turbidity, conductivity, and other process analyzers; measurements, calibration records, diagnostics, and alarm indications. |
| Flow, pressure, and level instruments | Flowmeters, pressure transmitters, and tank-level sensors; readings, quality flags, instrument diagnostics, and recorded parameter changes. |
| Filtration and backwash controls | Filter controllers, membrane-system controls, and backwash sequencing; cycle events, differential-pressure trends, overrides, and operating settings. |
| Telemetry radios and industrial gateways | Radio modems, cellular routers, protocol gateways, and remote communications equipment; connection events, communication failures, and configuration changes. |
| OT switches and industrial firewalls | Industrial Ethernet switches, segmentation firewalls, and network monitoring devices; port events, permitted or blocked connections, and administrative changes. |
| Remote-access and vendor support systems | OT access gateways, VPN appliances, jump servers, and vendor maintenance platforms; authentication, remote sessions, file transfers, and administrative activity where logged. |
Water IT Logs & Reports
| SCADA servers and control platforms | Supervisory control servers, alarm services, operator actions, communications events, and treatment or distribution control records. |
| Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) | Controllers operating pumps, valves, dosing equipment, and treatment sequences; program downloads, operating-mode changes, diagnostics, and configuration records where available. |
| Remote terminal units (RTUs) | Remote controllers at wells, reservoirs, tanks, and pumping stations; telemetry, communications status, field commands, and configuration records. |
| Human-machine interfaces (HMIs) | Operator panels and control-room displays; sign-ins, alarm acknowledgments, manual overrides, and setpoint changes where recorded. |
| Engineering workstations | PLC programming computers, configuration tools, project files, logic revisions, controller transfers, and maintenance-session records. |
| Process historians and alarm archives | Time-stamped process values, equipment states, alarm histories, trend data, and recorded changes across treatment and distribution operations. |
| Pump controls and variable-frequency drives | Pump controllers, motor controls, and VFDs; start/stop events, speed references, operating parameters, trips, and fault histories where available. |
| Motorized valves and actuators | Valve actuators, positioners, and control interfaces; commanded positions, position feedback, local/remote status, and fault indications. |
| Chemical dosing and disinfection controls | Metering-pump controllers, chlorination systems, and UV controllers; dosing settings, equipment status, alarms, and recorded operator adjustments. |
| Water-quality analyzers | Chlorine, pH, turbidity, conductivity, and other process analyzers; measurements, calibration records, diagnostics, and alarm indications. |
| Flow, pressure, and level instruments | Flowmeters, pressure transmitters, and tank-level sensors; readings, quality flags, instrument diagnostics, and recorded parameter changes. |
| Filtration and backwash controls | Filter controllers, membrane-system controls, and backwash sequencing; cycle events, differential-pressure trends, overrides, and operating settings. |
| Telemetry radios and industrial gateways | Radio modems, cellular routers, protocol gateways, and remote communications equipment; connection events, communication failures, and configuration changes. |
| OT switches and industrial firewalls | Industrial Ethernet switches, segmentation firewalls, and network monitoring devices; port events, permitted or blocked connections, and administrative changes. |
| Remote-access and vendor support systems | OT access gateways, VPN appliances, jump servers, and vendor maintenance platforms; authentication, remote sessions, file transfers, and administrative activity where logged. |
REMI uses AI to detect advanced adversarial AI cyberattack behaviors, correlate patterns across systems, and link findings to the original evidence.
REMI Water brings together SCADA alarms, PLC and HMI event logs, historian records, engineering workstation activity, remote-access sessions, and operational reports in one automated AI analysis pipeline. It correlates these records with IT authentication, server, and network logs to trace suspicious access, staged activity, control commands, and changes to treatment or distribution settings.
REMI reconstructs the sequence of events, identifies affected systems, and evaluates evidence of adversarial tampering versus internal misconfiguration. It generates an evidence-linked forensic timeline, diagrams, and a complete report set—including a Cyber SITREP with prioritized next response steps. Everything runs locally and fully offline.

REMI delivers a complete forensic report set—documenting what happened, linking the evidence, and prioritizing next response steps.
REMI Water automatically generates forensic reports, chronological timelines, and relationship diagrams that explain how an incident unfolded across utility IT and OT systems. Reports identify affected systems, trace suspicious access, and document control commands, configuration changes, and data transfers, with findings linked to the original records. A Cyber SITREP summarizes the incident, highlights operational concerns, and prioritizes recommended next steps for evidence preservation, containment, and verification—all generated locally and fully offline.
✅ Comprehensive forensic report
✅ Evidence-linked event timeline
✅ Affected systems and configuration changes
✅ Data transfer and suspicious activity findings
✅ Event and relationship diagrams
✅ SITREP with recommended next steps

You already have Sentinel security alerting so why purchase REMI.
Security tools raise the alerts. REMI turns the exported alerts into a timeline forensic narrative of how the events unfolded.
REMI Water turns exported security alerts, SCADA events, and IT/OT logs into a plain-English forensic narrative. It explains what happened, how events unfolded, and which accounts, workstations, and controllers were involved—connecting suspicious access with pump or valve commands, dosing and pressure-setpoint changes, staged files, and external communications. Its embedded AI assesses the evidence, distinguishes signs of cyber tampering from misconfiguration or documented maintenance, and generates targeted follow-up questions for unresolved findings. Within minutes, REMI delivers an evidence-linked report package with a timeline, diagrams, and a Cyber SITREP outlining recommended next steps—all locally and fully offline.
| Exported water IT and OT records | REMI’s plain-English explanation |
|---|---|
08:41:02 · Source=AccessGateway · Event=SessionStarted · Account=vendor_maint · Destination=ENG-WS-01 · Session=R204
|
A vendor maintenance account opened a session to the engineering workstation. Check whether the access matched an approved work order and maintenance window. |
08:44:17 · Source=EngineeringAudit · Event=ParameterWrite · Origin=ENG-WS-01 · Device=PLC-DIST-02 · Tag=DischargePressure_SP · Old=420 · New=520 · Unit=kPa
|
Three minutes later, the engineering workstation changed a distribution-pump pressure setpoint. The recorded target increased from 420 to 520 kPa. Verify the approved setting and the authorization for this change. |
08:45:06 · Source=SCADA · Alarm=DischargePressureHigh · Device=PLC-DIST-02 · Value=508 · Limit=500 · Unit=kPa
|
SCADA recorded a high-pressure alarm shortly after the setpoint change. The measured discharge pressure exceeded the recorded alarm limit. The timing connects the events for investigation; it does not establish the cause by itself. |
08:46:12 · Source=EndpointAudit · Host=ENG-WS-01 · Event=FileCreated · Path=C:\ProgramData\MaintCache\svcupdate.exe · Hidden=True
|
A hidden executable was recorded on the engineering workstation. Determine whether it belongs to approved maintenance software. File creation and a hidden attribute alone do not establish malware or execution. |
08:47:33 · Source=Firewall · Host=ENG-WS-01 · Destination=203.0.113.24:443 · Action=Allowed
|
The engineering workstation then connected to an external address. Correlate process records and approved vendor destinations to determine what initiated the connection and whether it relates to the earlier activity. |
|
The connected sequence Maintenance access → pressure-setpoint change → process alarm → hidden file → external connection |
Related IT and OT events warrant investigation for unauthorized changes and possible tool staging. Compare the sequence with maintenance documentation, controller change records, and endpoint evidence to assess whether it reflects authorized work, misconfiguration, or malicious activity. |
|
Assessment and follow-up questions Authorization · change provenance · file identity · process activity · destination ownership |
What additional evidence would resolve the remaining questions? Was the session approved? Which user or process issued the parameter write? Did the executable run? Is it signed and recognized? What process opened the external connection? Do historian trends support a relationship between the setting change and the alarm? |