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Cyber Security Solution For Electric Grid, Sub Stations IT & OT Networks

Your Power Network Is Experiencing a Disruption. Is It a System Misconfiguration—or Is a Cyberattack Underway?

Meet REMI AI for Electric Grids & Substations.

REMI Electric automatically reconstructs cyber incidents from exported IT and OT logs and reports across utility networks, grid control systems, and substations. Its embedded AI correlates authentication records, remote-access sessions, SCADA events, protective-relay records, control commands, and configuration changes to identify suspicious activity and distinguish evidence of cyber tampering from internal misconfiguration.

REMI traces how access occurred, which systems were affected, what settings or files changed, and whether suspicious activity extended into grid operations. It delivers evidence-linked forensic reports, timelines, diagrams, and a Cyber SITREP explaining the findings, unresolved questions, and recommended next response steps—all locally and fully offline.

REMI analyzes exported electric utility IT and OT records to detect cyberattack behaviors, identify affected systems, and link findings to the original evidence.

REMI Electric brings together SCADA events, protective-relay records, substation device logs, engineering workstation activity, remote-access sessions, and operational reports in one automated AI pipeline. It correlates these sources with IT authentication, server, and network logs to trace suspicious access, attack staging, control commands, and changes to protection settings or system configurations.

As records move through the pipeline, REMI normalizes their mixed formats into a unified dynamic schema and reconstructs the sequence of events. It generates an evidence-linked timeline, forensic reports, diagrams, and a Cyber SITREP identifying affected systems and prioritizing recommended next response steps—all locally and fully offline.

✅ Ingest mixed native logs and reports
✅ Normalize timestamps, fields, and event details
✅ Correlate accounts, devices, and activity
✅ Reconstruct an evidence-linked timeline
✅ Generate forensic reports, diagrams, and a SITREP

Electric IT Network

Endpoints and workstations Utility staff PCs, laptops, administrator workstations, and maintenance computers; operating-system events, application activity, and local security records.
Servers and storage Windows and Linux servers, file shares, storage platforms, and application servers; administrative activity, service changes, and file-access records.
Identity and authentication Active Directory, Entra ID, single sign-on, and multifactor authentication; sign-ins, account creation, authentication failures, and group membership changes.
Privileged access and service accounts Administrative accounts, service identities, and privileged-access platforms; elevated sessions, permission changes, and credential-management events.
Network devices and wireless Enterprise routers, switches, wireless controllers, access points, and network access controls; connection activity, port events, and configuration changes.
Firewalls and network security Perimeter and internal firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention, and network sensors; permitted or blocked connections, security alerts, and rule changes.
VPN and remote access VPN gateways, remote desktop services, jump servers, and vendor support platforms; authentication, remote sessions, and file transfers where logged.
DNS, web, proxy, and API services DNS servers, web proxies, web servers, reverse proxies, and API gateways; queries, requests, access records, and administrative changes.
Email and collaboration Mail servers, cloud mailboxes, email security, messaging, and document-sharing platforms; message tracing, mailbox access, sharing activity, and audit records.
Cloud platforms Cloud accounts, hosted applications, storage, and virtual networks; management audit logs, access events, and resource configuration changes.
Utility applications and databases Customer billing, asset management, GIS, work-order, and business database systems; application access, database activity, and integration records where available.
Virtualization and backups Hypervisors, virtual machines, backup servers, and recovery consoles; administrative sessions, snapshots, backup jobs, restores, and deletion events.
Endpoint protection and SIEM Antivirus, endpoint detection and response, security monitoring, and log collection platforms; detections, process activity, alerts, and policy changes.
Data protection and transfers Data-loss prevention, file-access auditing, removable-media controls, and transfer services; file movement, sharing activity, and policy violations where recorded.
Software deployment and patching Software distribution, patch management, configuration tools, and scheduled tasks; installations, updates, script execution, and administrative changes.
IT–OT integration services Authorized data exchange servers, historian interfaces, and integration gateways; service authentication, connection activity, transfers, and configuration records.
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Electric OT Network

SCADA and grid control platforms SCADA servers, energy management systems, and distribution management platforms; alarms, operator actions, control commands, and configuration records.
Protective relays and IEDs Digital protective relays and intelligent electronic devices; protection events, trip records, settings files, diagnostics, and access records where available.
Remote terminal units (RTUs) Substation and field RTUs; telemetry, equipment status, remote commands, communications events, and configuration records.
Substation gateways and station controllers Station computers, protocol gateways, and automation controllers; device communications, control routing, diagnostics, and configuration changes.
Human-machine interfaces (HMIs) Control-room workstations and local substation panels; sign-ins, alarm acknowledgments, switching commands, and operator changes where recorded.
Engineering workstations Relay configuration computers, programming tools, and maintenance laptops; settings revisions, project files, device transfers, and maintenance-session records.
Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) Controllers used in auxiliary systems and automation; logic downloads, operating-mode changes, diagnostics, and recorded control actions.
Breaker and switchgear controls Circuit-breaker control units, bay controllers, and switchgear interfaces; open/close commands, position feedback, interlock states, and operation counters where available.
Reclosers and feeder automation Recloser controllers, sectionalizers, and feeder automation systems; fault events, switching sequences, lockouts, remote commands, and settings changes.
Voltage and reactive-power controls Voltage regulator controllers, transformer tap-changer controls, and capacitor-bank controllers; setpoints, tap operations, switching events, and alarms.
Disturbance and event recorders Digital fault recorders and sequence-of-events systems; time-stamped equipment changes, disturbance waveforms, triggers, and exported event files.
Synchrophasor and power-quality systems Phasor measurement units, phasor data concentrators, and power-quality meters; synchronized measurements, frequency trends, disturbances, and device diagnostics.
Historians and operational archives Grid historians, alarm archives, and operational databases; recorded measurements, equipment states, event histories, and operator activity.
Distributed energy and storage controls Solar inverter controllers, battery energy storage controls, and microgrid controllers; operating modes, dispatch commands, setpoints, and alarms where available.
OT communications and time synchronization Industrial switches, routers, telemetry links, and time servers; connection events, communications failures, clock-status alarms, and configuration changes.
OT security and remote maintenance Industrial firewalls, secure access gateways, jump servers, and vendor maintenance platforms; access sessions, blocked connections, administrative activity, and transfers where logged.
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REMI uses AI to detect advanced adversarial AI cyberattack behaviors, correlate patterns across systems, and link findings to the original evidence.

REMI Electric analyzes exported logs and reports for connected sequences of suspicious access, process execution, remote commands, and configuration changes. Its AI correlates accounts, devices, timestamps, and communications to uncover attack staging, persistence, concealment, and coordinated activity across utility networks.

For grid and substation operations, these patterns can include a remote session followed by relay-setting changes, unexpected switching commands, disabled monitoring, or unusual communications between engineering workstations and field devices. REMI connects these events to evaluate evidence of cyber tampering versus internal misconfiguration and traces each finding to its supporting records.

✅ Suspicious access and privilege changes
✅ Attack staging, persistence, and concealment
✅ Unusual process execution and lateral movement
✅ Relay-setting and control-configuration changes
✅ Unexpected switching commands and communications
✅ Cross-system patterns linked to source evidence

You already have Sentinel security alerting so why purchase REMI?

Security tools raise the alerts. REMI turns the exported alerts into a timeline forensic narrative of how the events unfolded.

REMI Electric turns exported security alerts, SCADA events, relay records, and IT/OT logs into a plain-English forensic narrative. It explains what happened, how events unfolded, and which accounts, workstations, and substation devices were involved—connecting suspicious access with protection-setting changes, switching commands, staged files, and external communications. Its embedded AI assesses the evidence, distinguishes signs of cyber tampering from misconfiguration or documented maintenance, and generates targeted follow-up questions for unresolved findings. Within minutes, REMI delivers an evidence-linked report package with a timeline, diagrams, and a Cyber SITREP outlining recommended next steps—all locally and fully offline.

Exported electric utility IT and OT records REMI’s plain-English explanation
14:12:03 · Source=AccessGateway · Event=SessionStarted · Account=vendor_maint · Destination=SUB-ENG-01 · Session=E204 A vendor maintenance account opened a session to the substation engineering workstation. Compare the session with the approved work order, maintenance window, and authorized scope of access.
14:15:18 · Source=RelayAudit · Origin=SUB-ENG-01 · Device=RELAY-FDR-07 · Event=ActiveSettingGroupChanged · Old=Group-1 · New=Group-2 Three minutes later, the engineering workstation changed a feeder relay’s active protection-setting group. Review the approved protection configuration and the differences between the two groups to establish the significance and authorization of the change.
14:16:09 · Source=SequenceOfEvents · Device=RELAY-FDR-07 · Event=TripOutputAsserted · Breaker=CB-07 · Position=Open The event recorder subsequently recorded a relay trip output and an open feeder breaker. Examine relay targets, disturbance waveforms, and switching records to determine whether this was an expected protection operation. Timing alone does not prove the setting change caused the trip.
14:17:22 · Source=EndpointAudit · Host=SUB-ENG-01 · Event=FileCreated · Path=C:\ProgramData\MaintCache\svcupdate.exe · Hidden=True A hidden executable was recorded on the substation engineering workstation. Establish whether it belongs to approved engineering or maintenance software. File creation and a hidden attribute alone do not prove malware or execution.
14:18:31 · Source=Firewall · Host=SUB-ENG-01 · Destination=203.0.113.24:443 · Action=Allowed The same workstation then connected to an external address. Identify the initiating process and verify whether the destination is an approved vendor service and whether this communication is permitted for the workstation.
The connected grid sequence
Maintenance access → relay-setting group change → recorded trip → hidden file → external connection
The records connect engineering access, a protection-setting change, and a feeder event for investigation. Compare the sequence with authorized maintenance, protection records, and endpoint evidence to assess whether it reflects expected work, misconfiguration, or malicious interference.
Assessment and follow-up questions
Access authorization · protection settings · trip cause · file identity · communications
What evidence would resolve the remaining questions? Was the session approved? Who or what changed the active setting group? What protection element initiated the trip? Did the executable run, and is it recognized software? Which process opened the external connection? Do SCADA and outage records establish the operational impact?