Cyber Security Solution For Nuclear's Mixed IT & OT Networks
Your Nuclear Facility Is Experiencing Unexpected System Activity. Is It a Configuration Issue—or Is a Cyberattack Underway?
Meet REMI AI for Nuclear Facilities.
Nuclear cyber investigations involve records scattered across plant IT networks, digital instrumentation and control (I&C), engineering workstations, operator interfaces, plant historians, maintenance systems, and physical-access platforms. REMI Nuclear automatically correlates these exported logs and reports to reconstruct suspicious access, staged software, controller logic revisions, operating-parameter changes, and unexpected communications.
REMI identifies which accounts and systems were involved, what changed, and how events unfolded. It distinguishes evidence of adversarial tampering from configuration errors or documented maintenance activity, linking findings to the original records. A complete forensic report set—including timelines, diagrams, and a Cyber SITREP—explains the findings, unresolved questions, and recommended next steps under established plant procedures. Everything runs locally and fully offline.

REMI transforms mixed nuclear facility IT and OT records into a unified forensic investigation—preserving the evidence behind every finding.
REMI Nuclear ingests exported logs and reports from plant IT networks, digital instrumentation and control (I&C), engineering workstations, operator interfaces, plant historians, and maintenance systems. Its automated AI pipeline brings these different sources together to trace account activity, equipment events, software execution, and configuration changes.
As records move through the pipeline, REMI normalizes them into a unified dynamic schema that adapts to the incoming data. It aligns timestamps, field names, accounts, device identifiers, and event details while retaining links to the original records. This shared structure enables correlation across the supplied evidence without requiring a live connection between plant networks.
REMI reconstructs the sequence of events and generates evidence-linked forensic reports, timelines, diagrams, and a Cyber SITREP with prioritized next response steps—all locally and fully offline.
✅ Ingest mixed plant IT and OT logs and reports
✅ Normalize records into a unified dynamic schema
✅ Correlate accounts, devices, and maintenance activity
✅ Trace I&C events and configuration revisions
✅ Generate forensic reports, timelines, diagrams, and a SITREP
Nuclear Facility OT Network
| Digital instrumentation and control | Digital I&C platforms and associated controllers; diagnostic events, operating states, configuration records, and approved exports where available. |
| Operator interfaces and plant displays | Digital operator workstations, local interfaces, and plant display systems; operator actions, alarm acknowledgments, and recorded parameter changes. |
| Engineering and configuration workstations | Approved engineering tools and programming stations; logic revisions, configuration packages, device transfers, and maintenance-session records. |
| Plant process computers and historians | Process monitoring computers, historians, and operational archives; time-stamped measurements, equipment states, trends, and collection-status records. |
| Alarm and sequence-of-events systems | Digital alarm processors and event recorders; alarm transitions, acknowledgments, equipment changes, and time-stamped event exports. |
| Plant control and auxiliary controllers | Distributed control systems and PLCs where deployed; logic downloads, mode changes, diagnostics, and control-event records. |
| Turbine and generator controls | Digital turbine control, generator excitation, and associated monitoring systems; operating events, parameter revisions, alarms, and diagnostics. |
| Electrical protection and switchgear | Digital protective relays, breaker controls, and electrical monitoring devices; trip events, switching records, settings files, and fault data. |
| Digital instruments and equipment monitoring | Digital transmitters, analyzers, and condition-monitoring devices; measurements, calibration histories, diagnostics, and parameter records where available. |
| Maintenance and test equipment | Approved diagnostic computers, calibration tools, and test systems; test results, device connections, software versions, and recorded maintenance activity. |
| Plant communications and boundary devices | Industrial switches, approved gateways, and boundary protection devices; communications events, permitted transfers, diagnostics, and configuration records. |
| Time synchronization systems | Plant time servers and event-timing infrastructure; synchronization status, clock changes, timing faults, and related diagnostic records. |
Nuclear Facility IT Network
| Endpoints and workstations | Plant staff PCs, administrator workstations, and approved support laptops; operating-system events, application activity, and local security records. |
| Servers and storage | Application servers, file shares, document repositories, and storage platforms; administrative activity, service changes, and file-access records. |
| Identity and authentication | Directory services, authentication platforms, and multifactor authentication where deployed; sign-ins, account changes, and authentication failures. |
| Privileged access and service accounts | Administrative identities, service accounts, and privileged-access tools; elevated sessions, permission changes, and credential-management events. |
| Network infrastructure and firewalls | IT switches, routers, firewalls, and security sensors; connection records, blocked traffic, administrative access, and configuration changes. |
| Email and collaboration | Business email, messaging, and document-sharing systems; message tracing, mailbox access, attachment activity, and sharing records where available. |
| Maintenance and work management | Work-order, asset management, and maintenance planning systems; approved work histories, equipment records, and application audit trails. |
| Engineering document management | Controlled document repositories, drawing systems, and configuration-management applications; revisions, approvals, downloads, and access records. |
| Endpoint protection and monitoring | Antivirus, endpoint detection, log collectors, and security monitoring platforms; detections, process activity, alerts, and policy changes where recorded. |
| Backups and recovery | Backup servers, repositories, and recovery tools; backup jobs, restores, retention changes, and deletion events. |
| Removable media and file transfers | Approved media scanning stations and transfer services; device connections, scan results, file movement, and transfer audit records where available. |
| Authorized support access | Approved IT support gateways and maintenance access platforms where deployed; authentication, session activity, and administrative changes. |
REMI detects cyberattack behaviors through pattern analysis and correlation across nuclear facility IT and OT—linking findings to the original evidence.
REMI Nuclear brings together digital instrumentation and control (I&C) records, operator-interface events, plant historian data, engineering workstation activity, maintenance records, and operational reports in one automated AI pipeline. It correlates these sources with IT authentication, server, and network logs to trace access activity, controller revisions, operating-parameter changes, and unexpected communications.
As records move through the pipeline, REMI normalizes their mixed formats into a unified dynamic schema—aligning timestamps, accounts, device identifiers, and event details while preserving references to the original evidence. The pipeline reconstructs the sequence of events and generates forensic reports, timelines, diagrams, and a Cyber SITREP with recommended next response steps—all locally and fully offline.
✅ Ingest mixed nuclear facility IT and OT records
✅ Normalize timestamps, fields, and device identifiers
✅ Correlate access, maintenance, and I&C activity
✅ Trace logic, parameter, and configuration changes
✅ Generate evidence-linked reports, timelines, and a SITREP

REMI delivers a complete nuclear facility forensic report set—reconstructing events, linking the evidence, and prioritizing next response steps.
REMI Nuclear automatically generates forensic reports, chronological timelines, and relationship diagrams explaining how an incident unfolded across plant IT, digital instrumentation and control (I&C), and supporting systems. Reports identify affected assets, trace engineering and maintenance access, and document controller logic revisions, operating-parameter changes, and suspicious data transfers, with findings linked to the original records. A Cyber SITREP summarizes the evidence, highlights operational concerns and unresolved questions, and prioritizes recommended next steps for evidence preservation, investigation, and verification under established plant procedures—all generated locally and fully offline.
✅ Comprehensive nuclear facility forensic report
✅ Evidence-linked timeline of plant and cyber events
✅ Affected IT, OT, and digital I&C assets
✅ Logic, parameter, and configuration-change findings
✅ Access, data-transfer, and relationship diagrams
✅ Cyber SITREP with prioritized next response steps

Security tools raise the alerts. REMI turns the exported alerts into a timeline forensic narrative of how the events unfolded.
You already have Sentinel security alerting so why purchase REMI?
REMI Nuclear turns exported security alerts, digital instrumentation and control (I&C) events, engineering records, and plant IT/OT logs into a plain-English forensic narrative. It explains what happened, how events unfolded, and which accounts, workstations, and plant systems were involved—connecting maintenance access with controller revisions, parameter changes, monitoring interruptions, and suspicious files. Its embedded AI assesses the evidence, distinguishes signs of cyber tampering from misconfiguration or documented maintenance, and generates targeted follow-up questions for unresolved findings. Within minutes, REMI delivers an evidence-linked report package with a timeline, diagrams, and a Cyber SITREP outlining recommended next steps under established plant procedures—all locally and fully offline.
| Exported nuclear facility IT and OT records | REMI’s plain-English explanation |
|---|---|
10:12:03 · Source=WorkstationAudit · Event=InteractiveLogon · Account=maint_eng · Host=ENG-WS-04 · Session=N204
|
A maintenance engineering account signed in to an engineering workstation. Compare the access with the approved work package, assigned personnel, and maintenance window to determine whether the session was expected. |
10:15:18 · Source=ConfigurationAudit · Origin=ENG-WS-04 · Device=AUX-CTRL-02 · Event=ConfigurationApplied · OldRevision=R17 · NewRevision=R18
|
Three minutes later, the workstation applied a configuration revision to an auxiliary-system controller. Compare revisions R17 and R18 with the approved configuration package and change authorization to establish exactly what changed. |
10:16:09 · Source=PlantHistorian · Device=AUX-CTRL-02 · Event=DataQualityChanged · Old=Good · New=Bad · Reason=CommunicationTimeout
|
The historian then reported a loss of valid data from the same controller. This establishes a monitoring gap, not necessarily a process failure. Check controller diagnostics and maintenance records to determine whether the interruption was expected. |
10:17:22 · Source=EndpointAudit · Host=ENG-WS-04 · Event=FileCreated · Path=C:\ProgramData\MaintCache\svcupdate.exe · Hidden=True
|
A hidden executable was recorded on the engineering workstation. Establish whether the file belongs to approved maintenance software and how it arrived. Its name and hidden attribute alone do not establish malware or execution. |
10:18:31 · Source=BoundaryFirewall · Origin=ENG-WS-04 · Destination=SUPPORT-SRV-02:445 · Action=Denied · Rule=ZoneBoundaryPolicy
|
The workstation attempted a connection that the plant network boundary blocked. Identify the initiating process and verify whether the destination and requested service were authorized. The record shows a blocked attempt, not successful access or data transfer. |
|
The connected plant sequence Engineering sign-in → controller revision → historian data gap → hidden file → blocked boundary connection |
The records connect maintenance activity, a controller change, and subsequent monitoring and security events. Compare the sequence with approved work, configuration records, and endpoint evidence to assess whether it reflects documented maintenance, misconfiguration, or malicious interference. The sequence alone does not establish an effect on plant safety systems. |
|
Assessment and follow-up questions Work authorization · revision provenance · monitoring continuity · file identity · boundary activity |
What evidence would resolve the remaining questions? Was the engineering session authorized? Did revision R18 match the approved package? Was the communications interruption expected during the change? Did the executable run, and is it recognized software? Which process initiated the blocked connection? Do independent plant records confirm the equipment’s operating state? |